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Why	Europe	holds	unique	normative	power	in	the
Israeli-Palestine	conflict
The	Israel-Palestine	conflict	has	persisted	despite	decades	of	talks	and	attempts	at	mediation	from
other	regional	and	global	powers.	But	what	role	can	Europe	play	in	the	peace	process?	Drawing	on
a	recent	study,	Anders	Persson	highlights	that	despite	reservations	from	some	scholars	about
Europe’s	influence,	the	EU	has	significant	normative	power	to	shape	the	process,	particularly	in
situations	where	both	sides	of	the	conflict	actively	seek	international	political	support	for	their
respective	strategies.
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The	conventional	wisdom	in	the	academic	literature	on	EU–Israel/Palestine	relations	is	that	the	EU	has	only
displayed	very	limited,	if	any,	normative	power	in	the	Israeli–Palestinian	conflict.	Originally	developed	by	Ian
Manners	in	2002,	the	concept	of	‘Normative	Power	Europe’	(NPE)	is	based	on	two	parts.	The	first	is	the	ability	of
the	EU,	according	to	Manners,	‘to	define	what	passes	as	“normal”	in	world	politics’.	Secondly,	the	EU	has,
according	to	Manners,	gradually	developed	a	normative	framework	based	on	certain	values	that	it	tries	to
promote	in	its	foreign	policy.	Manners	identified	five	such	core	norms:	peace,	liberty,	democracy,	human	rights
and	the	rule	of	law.	Previous	studies	have	focused	on	the	ability,	or	rather	inability,	of	the	EU	to	diffuse	any	of	the
NPE	core	norms	into	the	Israeli–Palestinian	conflict,	while	tending	to	ignore	the	ability	of	the	EU	to	shape	what	is
considered	normal	in	many	aspects	of	the	conflict	–	either	by	making	others	adopt	its	policies,	or	by	contributing
to	creating	consensus	around	an	issue.
In	a	new	study,	I	argue	that	the	EU	has	indeed	significant	normative	justification	at	its	disposal	in	some	aspects	of
the	conflict;	that	both	the	Israeli	government	and	the	Palestinian	Authority	(PA)	have	attached	significant	value	to
the	EU’s	normative	power	in	some	cases	and	that	other	third	parties	–	from	the	U.S.	government	to	local	NGOs	–
have	been	influenced	by	the	EU’s	normative	power.	It	is	primarily	in	situations	where	Israel	and	the	Palestinians
actively	seek	or	otherwise	need	international	political	support	for	their	respective	strategies	that	the	ability	of	the
EU	to	diffuse	norms,	set	examples	and	shape	what	is	seen	as	normal	in	world	politics	–	in	other	words	its
normative	power	–	becomes	very	important.
Defining	what	constitutes	a	just	peace	in	the	conflict
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The	first	case	study	I	put	together	looks	at	the	EC/EU’s	declaratory	diplomacy	on	the	need	for	a	just	peace	in	the
conflict.	In	its	first	official	statement	on	the	conflict	in	1971,	the	EC	called	for	a	just	peace	in	the	conflict	without
even	mentioning	‘the	Palestinians’	as	part	of	the	conflict.	But	after	the	1973	war	and	the	subsequent	oil	crisis,	the
EC	became	the	leading	international	actor	in	promoting	Palestinian	claims	as	legitimate	demands	in	the	conflict.
At	one	point	in	1980,	in	one	of	the	earliest	manifestations	of	the	EC/EU’s	ability	to	set	an	example	and	normalise
its	position	in	an	important	aspect	of	the	conflict,	Israeli	Prime	Minister	Menachem	Begin	stated	that	there	was
nothing	graver	than	Europe’s	attempt	to	legitimise	the	PLO.	Moreover,	this	particular	example	clearly	shows	the
significant	value	that	Israel	attaches	to	the	EU’s	normative	power.	Indeed,	there	were	many	occasions	over	the
past	decades	when	the	EC/EU	has	issued	declarations	that	were	adopted	some	years	later	in	a	similar	way	by
other	countries	in	the	international	community,	most	notably	by	the	U.S.,	but	also	by	Israel	and	some	of	the	Arab
states.	This	clearly	suggests	an	underestimated	role	for	the	EU	in	influencing	the	attitudes	and	behaviours	of
others	in	the	conflict.
The	2011	Palestinian	bid	for	UN	membership
The	second	case	study	I	compiled	is	from	2010–11	when	it	became	clear	that	the	Palestinians	were	planning	to
seek	recognition	at	the	UN	for	a	Palestinian	state.	Europe	then	quickly	emerged	as	the	crucial	battlefield	for
whether	the	bid	would	succeed	or	not.	Both	the	Israeli	and	Palestinian	leaderships	openly	declared	that	they
would	measure	the	outcome	by	the	stance	adopted	by	the	EU	members.
An	Israeli	official	told	the	International	Crisis	Group	before	the	Palestinians	were	to	submit	their	application	to	the
UN	that	‘Europe	is	vital	because	Europe	is	the	key	to	international	legitimacy.	The	US	is	the	key	to	the	effective
exercise	of	power,	but	the	US	cannot	confer	legitimacy.	The	Europeans	alone	can	do	that.’	Never	before	in	its
soon	five	decades-long	involvement	in	the	Israeli–Palestinian	conflict	had	the	EU	been	in	such	a	pivotal	position.
This	was	indeed	Europe’s	moment,	a	chance	for	the	EU	to	really	use	its	normative	power	as	leverage	in	the
conflict.	But	when	the	hesitant	EU	countries	failed	to	back	the	Palestinian	bid,	Israel	instead	claimed	it	had
achieved	a	‘moral	majority’	against	the	Palestinians,	thereby	openly	acknowledging	the	EU’s	normative	power	on
this	issue.
Can	differentiation	make	any	difference?
My	third	case	study	emerged	in	2012-2013	when	the	EU	embarked	on	a	new	strategy	in	the	Israeli–Palestinian
conflict,	which	is	increasingly	referred	to	as	‘the	differentiation	strategy’.	Defined	by	the	European	Council	on
Foreign	Relations	(ECFR)	as	‘a	variety	of	measures	taken	by	the	EU	and	its	member	states	to	exclude
settlement-linked	entities	and	activities	from	bilateral	relations	with	Israel’,	the	differentiation	strategy	provides	a
new	and	highly	interesting	case	study	for	the	EU’s	normative	power.
While	the	differentiation	measures	taken	so	far	by	the	EU	by	no	means	have	stopped	Israel’s	expansion	of
settlements,	they	have	contributed	to	the	non-recognition	of	them.	Similar	to	the	first	case	study,	there	is	much
evidence	here	to	show	that	the	EU	has	acted	as	an	example	and	shaped	the	discourse	on	differentiation.	A
number	of	companies	and	institutions	have	divested	from	Israeli	entities	directly	involved	in	the	occupation	in
recent	years.	In	2016	and	2017	there	was	also	a	growing	trend	of	what	I	call	‘grassroots	differentiation’,	where	the
PA,	NGOs	and	other	activists	were	involved	in	trying	to	get	organisations	like	FIFA	and	companies	like	Airbnb,
PayPal	and	Hewlett-Packard	to	suspend	their	activities	with	Israeli	entities	behind	the	Green	Line.
The	limits	of	normative	power
The	occupation	of	the	Palestinian	territories	has	now	been	in	place	for	around	half	a	century,	and	Israel’s	hold
over	the	territories	is	seemingly	stronger	than	ever	before.	But	so	is	the	non-recognition	of	the	occupation	and	the
settlements.	Not	a	single	country	in	the	world	recognises	that	the	West	Bank	is	part	of	Israel.	As	my	first	case
study	illustrates,	the	EU	has	changed	the	discourse	over	a	Palestinian	state,	but	not	the	reality	on	the	ground.
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While	this	is	a	clear	example	of	the	EU’s	normative	power,	it	is	perhaps	an	even	clearer	example	of	the	limits	of
‘pure’	normative	power,	which	is	entirely	disconnected	from	material	power.	The	differentiation	strategy,	including
what	I	refer	to	as	grassroots	differentiation,	will	probably	develop	further,	but	a	key	question	is	to	what	extent
future	differentiation	measures	will	focus	on	Israeli	state	entities	involved	in	the	settlements,	as	opposed	to	the
mostly	exclusive	settlement	focus	it	has	had	so	far.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	draws	on	the	author’s	recent	study	in	the	Journal	of	Common	Market	Studies.	The	article	gives
the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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